mirror of
https://github.com/titanscouting/tra-analysis.git
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242 lines
7.7 KiB
JavaScript
242 lines
7.7 KiB
JavaScript
/**
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* Javascript implementation of PKCS#1 PSS signature padding.
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*
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* @author Stefan Siegl
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2012 Stefan Siegl <stesie@brokenpipe.de>
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*/
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var forge = require('./forge');
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require('./random');
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require('./util');
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// shortcut for PSS API
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var pss = module.exports = forge.pss = forge.pss || {};
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/**
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* Creates a PSS signature scheme object.
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*
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* There are several ways to provide a salt for encoding:
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*
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* 1. Specify the saltLength only and the built-in PRNG will generate it.
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* 2. Specify the saltLength and a custom PRNG with 'getBytesSync' defined that
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* will be used.
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* 3. Specify the salt itself as a forge.util.ByteBuffer.
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*
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* @param options the options to use:
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* md the message digest object to use, a forge md instance.
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* mgf the mask generation function to use, a forge mgf instance.
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* [saltLength] the length of the salt in octets.
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* [prng] the pseudo-random number generator to use to produce a salt.
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* [salt] the salt to use when encoding.
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*
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* @return a signature scheme object.
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*/
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pss.create = function(options) {
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// backwards compatibility w/legacy args: hash, mgf, sLen
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if(arguments.length === 3) {
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options = {
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md: arguments[0],
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mgf: arguments[1],
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saltLength: arguments[2]
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};
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}
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var hash = options.md;
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var mgf = options.mgf;
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var hLen = hash.digestLength;
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var salt_ = options.salt || null;
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if(typeof salt_ === 'string') {
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// assume binary-encoded string
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salt_ = forge.util.createBuffer(salt_);
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}
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var sLen;
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if('saltLength' in options) {
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sLen = options.saltLength;
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} else if(salt_ !== null) {
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sLen = salt_.length();
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} else {
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throw new Error('Salt length not specified or specific salt not given.');
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}
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if(salt_ !== null && salt_.length() !== sLen) {
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throw new Error('Given salt length does not match length of given salt.');
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}
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var prng = options.prng || forge.random;
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var pssobj = {};
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/**
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* Encodes a PSS signature.
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*
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* This function implements EMSA-PSS-ENCODE as per RFC 3447, section 9.1.1.
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*
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* @param md the message digest object with the hash to sign.
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* @param modsBits the length of the RSA modulus in bits.
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*
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* @return the encoded message as a binary-encoded string of length
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* ceil((modBits - 1) / 8).
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*/
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pssobj.encode = function(md, modBits) {
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var i;
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var emBits = modBits - 1;
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var emLen = Math.ceil(emBits / 8);
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/* 2. Let mHash = Hash(M), an octet string of length hLen. */
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var mHash = md.digest().getBytes();
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/* 3. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "encoding error" and stop. */
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if(emLen < hLen + sLen + 2) {
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throw new Error('Message is too long to encrypt.');
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}
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/* 4. Generate a random octet string salt of length sLen; if sLen = 0,
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* then salt is the empty string. */
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var salt;
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if(salt_ === null) {
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salt = prng.getBytesSync(sLen);
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} else {
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salt = salt_.bytes();
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}
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/* 5. Let M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt; */
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var m_ = new forge.util.ByteBuffer();
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m_.fillWithByte(0, 8);
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m_.putBytes(mHash);
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m_.putBytes(salt);
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/* 6. Let H = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen. */
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hash.start();
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hash.update(m_.getBytes());
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var h = hash.digest().getBytes();
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/* 7. Generate an octet string PS consisting of emLen - sLen - hLen - 2
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* zero octets. The length of PS may be 0. */
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var ps = new forge.util.ByteBuffer();
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ps.fillWithByte(0, emLen - sLen - hLen - 2);
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/* 8. Let DB = PS || 0x01 || salt; DB is an octet string of length
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* emLen - hLen - 1. */
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ps.putByte(0x01);
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ps.putBytes(salt);
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var db = ps.getBytes();
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/* 9. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1). */
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var maskLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
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var dbMask = mgf.generate(h, maskLen);
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/* 10. Let maskedDB = DB \xor dbMask. */
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var maskedDB = '';
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for(i = 0; i < maskLen; i++) {
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maskedDB += String.fromCharCode(db.charCodeAt(i) ^ dbMask.charCodeAt(i));
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}
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/* 11. Set the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
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* maskedDB to zero. */
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var mask = (0xFF00 >> (8 * emLen - emBits)) & 0xFF;
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maskedDB = String.fromCharCode(maskedDB.charCodeAt(0) & ~mask) +
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maskedDB.substr(1);
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/* 12. Let EM = maskedDB || H || 0xbc.
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* 13. Output EM. */
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return maskedDB + h + String.fromCharCode(0xbc);
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};
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/**
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* Verifies a PSS signature.
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*
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* This function implements EMSA-PSS-VERIFY as per RFC 3447, section 9.1.2.
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*
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* @param mHash the message digest hash, as a binary-encoded string, to
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* compare against the signature.
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* @param em the encoded message, as a binary-encoded string
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* (RSA decryption result).
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* @param modsBits the length of the RSA modulus in bits.
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*
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* @return true if the signature was verified, false if not.
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*/
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pssobj.verify = function(mHash, em, modBits) {
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var i;
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var emBits = modBits - 1;
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var emLen = Math.ceil(emBits / 8);
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/* c. Convert the message representative m to an encoded message EM
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* of length emLen = ceil((modBits - 1) / 8) octets, where modBits
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* is the length in bits of the RSA modulus n */
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em = em.substr(-emLen);
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/* 3. If emLen < hLen + sLen + 2, output "inconsistent" and stop. */
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if(emLen < hLen + sLen + 2) {
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throw new Error('Inconsistent parameters to PSS signature verification.');
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}
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/* 4. If the rightmost octet of EM does not have hexadecimal value
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* 0xbc, output "inconsistent" and stop. */
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if(em.charCodeAt(emLen - 1) !== 0xbc) {
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throw new Error('Encoded message does not end in 0xBC.');
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}
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/* 5. Let maskedDB be the leftmost emLen - hLen - 1 octets of EM, and
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* let H be the next hLen octets. */
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var maskLen = emLen - hLen - 1;
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var maskedDB = em.substr(0, maskLen);
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var h = em.substr(maskLen, hLen);
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/* 6. If the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet in
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* maskedDB are not all equal to zero, output "inconsistent" and stop. */
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var mask = (0xFF00 >> (8 * emLen - emBits)) & 0xFF;
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if((maskedDB.charCodeAt(0) & mask) !== 0) {
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throw new Error('Bits beyond keysize not zero as expected.');
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}
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/* 7. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1). */
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var dbMask = mgf.generate(h, maskLen);
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/* 8. Let DB = maskedDB \xor dbMask. */
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var db = '';
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for(i = 0; i < maskLen; i++) {
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db += String.fromCharCode(maskedDB.charCodeAt(i) ^ dbMask.charCodeAt(i));
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}
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/* 9. Set the leftmost 8emLen - emBits bits of the leftmost octet
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* in DB to zero. */
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db = String.fromCharCode(db.charCodeAt(0) & ~mask) + db.substr(1);
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/* 10. If the emLen - hLen - sLen - 2 leftmost octets of DB are not zero
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* or if the octet at position emLen - hLen - sLen - 1 (the leftmost
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* position is "position 1") does not have hexadecimal value 0x01,
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* output "inconsistent" and stop. */
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var checkLen = emLen - hLen - sLen - 2;
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for(i = 0; i < checkLen; i++) {
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if(db.charCodeAt(i) !== 0x00) {
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throw new Error('Leftmost octets not zero as expected');
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}
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}
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if(db.charCodeAt(checkLen) !== 0x01) {
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throw new Error('Inconsistent PSS signature, 0x01 marker not found');
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}
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/* 11. Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB. */
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var salt = db.substr(-sLen);
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/* 12. Let M' = (0x)00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt */
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var m_ = new forge.util.ByteBuffer();
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m_.fillWithByte(0, 8);
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m_.putBytes(mHash);
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m_.putBytes(salt);
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/* 13. Let H' = Hash(M'), an octet string of length hLen. */
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hash.start();
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hash.update(m_.getBytes());
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var h_ = hash.digest().getBytes();
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/* 14. If H = H', output "consistent." Otherwise, output "inconsistent." */
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return h === h_;
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};
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return pssobj;
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};
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